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When are struggles for basic rights by weak social groups able to have an impact on 
public institutions and make them more responsive and accountable?1 This chapter 
responds to this question by drawing from the experience of an ongoing struggle by 
council tenants in Mombasa, Kenya for decent housing conditions, secure tenure, 
functioning urban services, and an end to the grabbing of public land in the municipality.2 
Lessons from social movement literature suggest that in assessing the impact or 
effectiveness of such struggles it is necessary to pay attention not only to internal factors 
such as how the movement is organised, what resources it is able to mobilise, and the 
terms in which it articulates its claims, but also to external factors such as the nature of 
the state, the configuration of public institutions and the broader political context (Tarrow 
1998; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). In a paper exploring how citizens’ exercise of 
voice may more directly influence policy and service delivery, and how public 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, the term ‘accountability’ is understood as comprising two dimensions: 
answerability (that public officials/institutions are under obligation to justify their actions) and 
enforceability (that sanction follows failure to account and failure to perform and that citizens have redress 
for harm suffered) (see chapter 2). Responsiveness is used in the sense articulated by Goetz and Gaventa: 
‘the extent to which a public service agency demonstrates receptivity to the views, complaints and 
suggestions of service users, by implementing changes to its own structure, culture and service delivery 
patterns in order to deliver a more appropriate product’ (Goetz and Gaventa 2001: 6).  
2 The author is part of a team of Institute of Development Studies (IDS) researchers that has had close 
interaction with the Mombasa council tenants for three years (since 2002). Part of the participatory action 
research involved facilitating their strategic planning. It is hoped that the reflections in this chapter will 
make further contributions to that process of shaping a strategic vision for the struggle.  
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institutions can be more ‘client-focused’, Goetz and Gaventa employ a framework that 
breaks down this combined analysis of internal and external factors into three key 
questions (Goetz and Gaventa 2001: 10):  
1 What is the social, cultural and economic power of the group? (This interrogates 
the extent to which there is a united and well-organised constituency that is able 
to articulate its entitlements clearly, able to attract allies in strategic places, and 
enjoys broad social support for its claims.) 
2 What is the nature of the political system? (This interrogates the depth of 
procedural and substantive democracy: the manner in which executive, legislative 
and judicial power is organised, and the genuineness of political party competition 
based on ideas and programmes.) 
3 What is the nature of the state and its bureaucracies? (This interrogates the extent 
to which there is a professional and relatively autonomous civil service, a level of 
commitment to reform in the bureaucratic culture and practice, and pro-poor 
responsiveness.)  
 
These questions provide a useful framework for taking stock of and accounting for gains 
and losses of the council tenants’ ten-year struggle in terms of ability to have an impact 
on public institutions and make them more accountable. But first, what is the context of 
the struggle: who is involved and what are the main issues?  
 
Background 
The city of Mombasa is Kenya’s sea port and its second largest city, with a population of 
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about 700,000.3 The city has an officially acknowledged housing crisis (Central Bureau 
of Statistics 1999: 15). The worst manifestation of the crisis is in the slums that have 
mushroomed in the city over the last ten years. But equally visible is the severe 
deterioration in the quality of existing low- and middle-income housing, which is also in 
short supply. Most people in this income group have only two options to choose from: on 
the one hand, the ‘Swahili’ type houses4 (built out of mud and mangrove poles) occupied 
by several families, each household having a single room.5 Cooking and toilet facilities 
are communal, with no proper sanitation services as they are located in unplanned, semi-
permanent settlements. On the other hand, council-owned estates constructed in the 
colonial era that have not seen much maintenance since the mid-1980s. Among these 
estates are Tudor, Changamwe and Mzizima, where the tenants’ associations’ 
mobilisation work began.6  
 
The tenants’ associations from these three estates joined together in November 2002 to 
form the Shelter Committee of ILISHE7 Trust, an umbrella organisation bringing together 
                                                 
3 The last population census was held in 1999. Mombasa’s population then was 643,168, with 181,849 
households (Central Bureau of Statistics 1999: 15). 
4 This is the most common type of housing available. The particular history of land tenure and 
administration in the coastal region has produced a high incidence of absentee landlordism, so it is common 
to find that the owner of the house is not the owner of the land, but collects rent from tenants who each rent 
a room and share bathroom facilities. Technically their tenure is insecure because they could be evicted and 
the structures demolished should the landowner claim the land back.  
5 This single-room living arrangement is not unique to Mombasa. The 1999 census found that 59 per cent 
of urban households nationally live in a single room. In the capital city, Nairobi, the figure is 67 per cent 
(Central Bureau of Statistics: 1999: 18–19). 
6 Unless otherwise stated, the information presented here about the estates was generated by the Tenants’ 
Associations from historical profiles, collective mapping exercises and interviews with key informants such 
as elderly residents and one active member of Changamwe Village Development Association who is a 
retired councillor and therefore had access to the council’s archives. Their findings were then presented and 
discussed at a workshop in April 2003 which the author and his associates helped to facilitate. See ‘Sharing 
Experiences and Mapping out Strategies for Advancing the Struggle for Shelter Rights’ (Joint workshop for 
Tudor, Mzizima and Changamwe Tenants’ Associations – Mombasa, Kenya, 15 and 24 April 2003). 
7 ILISHE stands for ‘Ilimu Sheria’, Kiswahili for ‘legal awareness’. 
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community-based groups in the Coast province. The Shelter Committee helps to mobilise 
other council tenants facing similar problems with the aim of ultimately getting all 18 
council estates involved and active in the struggle. The tenants’ struggle can be summed 
up as being about four issues: decent housing conditions, functioning urban services, 
secure tenure and fighting the grabbing of public land. 
 
Decent housing conditions 
Under the terms of the lease agreement, the council has an obligation to maintain the 
houses. The council has not undertaken routine maintenance tasks such as painting of the 
exterior, or repairs and replacements of the fixtures, since the early 1980s. Tenants are 
forbidden to make any ‘alterations or additions whatsoever’ to the flat or ‘any fixtures 
and fittings therein’ without the council’s consent. The council’s established practice of 
withholding consent notwithstanding, those tenants who can afford it have been forced by 
circumstances to resort to self-help measures such as replacing sinks, toilets, doors and 
windows, and even improvised wooden staircases. However, for tenants living in blocks 
with shared ablution facilities, the deterioration has not seen such mitigation; these tend 
to be poorer tenants and also it would take the agreement and financial contribution of 
several households to tackle these problems.  
 
Functioning urban services 
The city has been in economic decline for the last ten years (Gatabaki-Kamau et al. 2000: 
1). This economic decline was made worse by politically motivated clashes just prior to 
the 1997 elections. Key sectors of the economy, such as tourism, suffered huge setbacks, 
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as did the urban infrastructure.8 Water and sanitation services are poor in the city as a 
whole, but low-income areas are hardest hit. Estates such as Tudor have not had running 
water since 1995, a situation made worse by an ongoing dispute between the council and 
the state-operated National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation. Yet the tenants 
have continued to pay for water and sewerage services they do not receive, since these 
charges are included in their rent charges. Here, too, the tenants have resorted to self-help 
measures. A women’s group in Tudor estate sank a borehole that sells water to the 
residents. People also buy water from vendors who cart water around the estates. 
 
Secure tenure 
As tenants with written lease agreements, the council tenants are more tenure-secure than 
most low-income residents of Mombasa. But tenure security is much more than having an 
official document: council tenants do not feel secure. Corrupt practices in the council’s 
department of housing, irregular practices such as rigging waiting lists, and backdated 
eviction notices used to evict people without the benefit of the notice period required by 
the tenancy agreement all contribute to the feeling of insecurity. The tenants speak of an 
increasing trend of people having to teremka (go down the slope) literally and 
figuratively into the muoroto (slum) on the periphery of the estate because they have 
either been unable to pay the rent, or unable to fight off an irregular reallocation of their 
lease to another tenant favoured by some council official or councillor. Thus the search 
for tenure security is expressed first and foremost in demands for an end to corruption. 
                                                 
8 Following the 1997 clashes, average hotel occupancy fell to 26 per cent. The tourism sector suffered 
further setbacks with the embassy bombing in 1998. As of 1999, average hotel occupancy had fallen to 11 
per cent (Gatabaki-Kamau et al. 2000: 2). The bombing of an Israeli-owned resort at the coast in 2002 
further devastated Mombasa’s economy. 
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The search for tenure security also takes the form of demands for transfer of ownership to 
the tenants.  
 
Fighting the grabbing of public land 
In Kenya it is impossible to talk about the crisis in public housing without talking about 
land grabbing and therefore about corruption among bureaucrats and politicians. ‘Land 
grabbing’ has defined Kenyan politics, particularly in the 1990s, according to the 
Ndung’u Commission, which was set up in July 2003 to investigate illegal/irregular 
allocations of public land (Government of Kenya 2004). Land grabbing refers to irregular 
allocation of land set aside for public purposes, or any government-owned land, to private 
individuals or corporations. Many allocations did not follow the procedure laid down in 
the Government Lands Act. Allocations followed the exception rather than the rule: 
regular allocation procedure should go through an Allocation Committee. An exception 
permits the president (a power delegated to the Commissioner for Lands) in exceptional 
circumstances to bypass the allocations committee and give a direct grant through a letter 
of allocation. This became the standard procedure, doing away with scrutiny in all 
allocations.  
 
Mombasa council tenants’ mobilisation efforts sprang from resistance to land grabbing, 
since Mzizima and Tudor estates were threatened with this fate in the mid-1990s. The 
council’s plans to sell off the estates were foiled by a combination of high-profile 
campaigns by the tenants and a hitch in the financing arrangements.  
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The next three sections analyse the tenants’ struggle through the lens of an adaptation of 
the framework suggested by Goetz and Gaventa to respond to the central question: when 
are struggles for basic rights by weak social groups able to impact on public institutions 
and make them more responsive and accountable? The next section will address how to 
assess a group’s social, cultural and economic power, which is necessary to hold public 
institutions to account. 
 
What is the social, political, cultural and economic power of the group? 
Social and political power 
This can be assessed on two counts: first, does the struggle have broad membership so as 
to command social legitimacy? Second, does it offer incentives for people to join and 
stay engaged in collective action?  
 
There is an important question regarding the membership in social movements.  In 
particular, who is in the tenants’ struggle? Is its membership broadly representative of 
council tenants in Mombasa? As has already been stated, the struggle originated in three 
estates. The Shelter Committee formally started outreach activities in the other council 
estates in 2003. By December 2004 eight other estates had been added to the number. 
However, this represents a swelling in numbers rather than organic growth into a 
movement. It was precipitated by response to an immediate threat: in July 2004 the 
tenants received letters from the National Housing Corporation telling them that they 
would henceforth be required to pay their rent to the corporation, and also that the rent 
would be increased. This is on account of a dispute between the council and the 
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corporation over outstanding amounts that the council owes to the corporation. The 
tenants mobilised and through ILISHE instructed a lawyer, who has since managed to 
secure a temporary injunction to prevent the National Housing Corporation from 
collecting any rent, pending hearing of a case filed by the tenants to determine whether 
the council or the corporation is the landlord.9  
 
The links between the Shelter Committee and these eight estates are through key 
individuals rather than a critical mass, and therefore broad ownership of the struggle is 
something that needs to be cultivated. Discussion on how to expand the structure of 
decision making in the Shelter Committee so as to accommodate them is still at an 
exploratory stage. In terms of geographical spread, therefore, it is fair to say that the 
membership has not been broad enough to include a majority of the people affected by 
the issues central to the struggle. 
 
Even within the three estates in which the struggle is most active, more could be done to 
achieve broader inclusiveness. With the discontinuation of the savings scheme there is no 
register of members as such, and so it is difficult to say with certainty how many are 
‘paid-up’ members of the tenants’ association in each estate. There is an identifiable core 
group that stays active, but mobilisation in the bulk of the estates has peaked and 
plateaued, depending on whether there was some imminent threat that called for unified 
resistance.  
 
                                                 
9 Personal communication with Justus Munyithia, counsel for ILISHE, 18 April 2005. The case reference is 
Wilson Ndolo and others v Municipal Council of Mombasa and National Housing Corporation, Chief 
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Does membership cut across divides? In terms of socio-economic class the group is 
relatively homogeneous. Therefore the divides that have mattered most are ethnicity and 
political party affiliation. The joint Shelter Committee has managed to function relatively 
smoothly, notwithstanding diversity in ethnic origin and political party affiliation. Coast 
province is characterised by a very particular politics of ethnicity that polarises 
‘indigenous’ coastal peoples (watu wa pwani) and people from up-country (watu wa 
bara). The politically instigated clashes that preceded the 1997 general elections were 
fuelled by this polarisation. Political party affiliation broadly follows this pattern. The 
area has been a key stronghold of the former ruling party, KANU (the Kenya African 
National Union, in power for the last 40 years until the 2002 elections), and therefore 
coastal peoples are presumed to be KANU loyalists. Up-country people are presumed to 
support the former opposition, now in the governing coalition.  
 
Tensions along these lines occasionally manifest themselves in relationships among the 
tenants and with external actors. There has been talk about the disruptive effect of the 
election campaigning seasons, when some tenants’ association officials double up as 
party activists. If they undertake door-to-door recruitment exercises for their party, will 
people not identify them with that party the next time they come on a mobilisation 
exercise for the estate’s tenants’ association? There was one acknowledged incident of a 
tenants’ association becoming deadlocked for months over unresolved differences 
between two officials belonging to rival political parties that had clashed during the 
campaign. This has subsequently been resolved following open discussion at the joint 
                                                                                                                                                 
Magistrate’s Court Case No. 4542 of 2004.  
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Shelter Committee level and binding arbitration.10  
 
In order for the group to acquire and maintain membership it needs to show that it has 
something to offer. They need to demonstrate this to persons who remain aloof [meaning 
in this context?] in the estates in which the tenants’ associations have been active, as well 
as to the unreached estates. Those active in the struggle cite solidarity and the 
amplification of voice (kupaza sauti kwa pamoja) as the most significant benefits of 
belonging to the tenants’ struggle. One other benefit cited is membership in ILISHE 
Trust, which promises support in the form of connections to professional organisations 
(legal aid providers, for example), access to the media, and a means to secure funding 
(even though the latter is not guaranteed). What is lacking is a clear articulation and 
popularisation of the ultimate vision or desired outcome of the struggle, whether that be 
winning the right to own their houses or clarity in and implementation of the council’s 
obligations to maintain the houses and deliver services. Clear articulation of the long-
term goal is important in view of the weight of immediate disincentives to joining this 
type of struggle. Housing in Mombasa is difficult to come by. Therefore council housing 
– with all its problems – is still desirable. Many would not want to jeopardise a tenancy 
status that is already precarious and expose themselves to reprisals in the form of 
evictions or, even worse, job losses for those tenants who are also council employees. 
                                                 
10 There is a tricky balance to strike between staying politically engaged as individual citizens free to form 
party or other affiliations, and at the same time building up (or at least not undermining) the inclusiveness 
and social legitimacy of the struggle. Open discussion is a good start and needs to become a regular 
practice, not just in response to extreme cases. In addition, perhaps it is time the group agreed to some 
general principles on their members’ political engagement: for instance, agreeing not to use the tenants’ 
association’s name to further partisan activities, and not wearing party insignia to tenants’ association 
events.  
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People need to be persuaded that there are long-term benefits that make the risks in the 
short term worthwhile. 
 
Cultural power 
‘Cultural power’ is a useful label for exploring a group’s ability to influence public 
discourse on the issues that define the struggle. To paraphrase Goetz and Gaventa (2001: 
41), it refers to the effective use of the media and other public forums to gain support for 
their cause and to shame and praise officials; the group’s ability to successfully challenge 
presumptions (especially official presumptions) about the group and their struggle; and 
the ability to build credibility by combining protest with constructive engagement.  
 
Use of media to gain support and to shame and praise 
The tenants’ struggle has used the media and public forums quite effectively, particularly 
when a specific threat was imminent. It was a high-profile media campaign that thwarted 
the council’s secret plans in 1997 to relocate Mzizima tenants (who are low-cadre 
employees of the council) so as to make room for a private housing development that 
would price out low-income earners from that neighbourhood.11 In 2000 Mzizima tenants 
made their case before a presidential commission that had been set up to propose changes 
to the land law system.12 Media publicity had earlier exposed planned evictions intended 
to make way for similar redevelopment in Tudor estate.13 Tudor tenants credit their 
campaign for the decision by the National Social Security Fund to withdraw from 
                                                 
11 See Miano Kihu, ‘We’ll Resist Eviction by Council, Vow 114 Families’, Sunday Nation, 24 October 
1999. 
12 Memorandum of Mzizima Staff Housing Estate to the Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System 
in Kenya (the Njonjo Commission), 6 July 2000. 
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negotiations for the financing of the redevelopment, which essentially halted the 
council’s plans. In 1995 a concerted media campaign made the council shelve plans for a 
steep hike in rent, averting the full hearing of a court case that the tenants had initiated to 
challenge the rent increase.  
 
The tenants now need to strategise for a more proactive media strategy that goes beyond 
mainstream media, particularly for the purpose of reaching into council estates in 
Mombasa. In order to win broad public support for reform of public housing policy 
nationally, the struggle also needs to be presented in terms of a vision for broader social 
transformation, articulating the struggle as being about offering an alternative vision 
rather than simply securing gains for the immediate constituency (Hunt 1990).14 For 
instance, the campaign to resist private real estate developers is being pursued not only 
on the basis that tenants who cannot afford high rents will be displaced, but more broadly 
to ensure city policies that put people’s basic shelter rights ahead of profits. 
 
Shaming and praising of officials could be sharpened and made more evidence-based. In 
tackling land grabbing, for instance, Changamwe residents carried out impressive 
investigative work and compiled a list of the reference numbers of all the illegally 
allocated plots, along with the names of the people to whom they had been allocated. 
Missing from the list, however, were the names of the officials involved in the 
allocations. The obstacles to obtaining this information are enormous (as the Ndung’u 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 See ‘Council in KShs. 4b Project’ Daily Nation, 19 July 1994. 
14 Employing a Gramscian framework of analysis, Hunt refers to this process as one of counter-hegemony: 
‘the process by which subordinate classes challenge the dominant hegemony and seek to supplant it by 
articulating an alternative hegemony’ (Hunt 1990: 312). 
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Commission found out), but determined groups have been able to obtain it through a 
combination of formal and informal networks. 
 
 
Challenging presumptions 
The importance of challenging presumptions (especially official presumptions) about the 
group and its struggle cannot be overemphasised. In official discourse the tenants are 
perceived as no more than ungrateful beneficiaries of heavily subsidised housing. The 
tenants’ own account is that it is they who subsidise the council: with the council’s failure 
to carry out routine maintenance since the mid-1980s, tenants have been forced to carry 
out major repairs at their own expense to make the houses habitable, knowing full well 
that the council will never reimburse these ‘unauthorised repairs’, nor will they be able to 
remove fixtures they have installed at the end of their tenancy, as this will be treated as 
vandalism.  
 
This is common knowledge among the tenants, but in public discourse on council 
housing it is not. Making it more explicit could change the way in which ‘subsidy’ is 
understood, thus legitimising the tenants’ alternative account. Literature on social 
movements and rights suggests that, in order for weaker social groups to be able to 
institutionalise and consolidate their gains, they must work towards legitimising their 
alternative vision so that it becomes the ‘hegemonic’ position (the taken-for-granted way 
of thinking or doing things) (Hunt 1990). 
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Building credibility by combining protest with constructive engagement 
Has the tenants’ struggle worked to build credibility by combining protest with 
constructive engagement? It has been easier for the council tenants to agree on what they 
are against than to agree on a shared vision for proactive action. Whereas many who are 
active in the Shelter Committee see the ultimate aim of the struggle in terms of being able 
to purchase the houses from the council, there are some who will be content if the council 
carries out repairs, involves the tenants by allowing them to contribute through their 
labour and ideas, and takes this contribution into account in calculating the new rents so 
that the resulting rent increment is not too large.15 There is also lack of agreement on the 
eligibility criteria for purchase, with some holding the view that only residents of at least 
ten years’ standing should be allowed to participate (ILISHE 2002: 22). It will be 
necessary to carry out a detailed assessment of views among the residents so as to 
determine what vision is broadly representative. Engaging the council and other relevant 
public institutions on a constructive agenda will require the identifying and crafting of the 
key message, so that it can be targeted on the institutions most likely to intervene 
effectively. It will also require clear ideas for action, in the form of concrete, carefully 
budgeted proposals to the council.  
 
Economic power 
In the mid-1990s and into the late 1990s the tenants’ associations in the three estates 
operated savings schemes, both to finance the struggle and to build up a funding base that 
would enable them to leverage financing for the purchase of the houses. These schemes 
have since lapsed. Except for ad hoc collections to deal with emergencies, there is no 
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effort to fundraise among the membership. Now, since the joint Shelter Committee is one 
of the constituent committees of ILISHE Trust, ILISHE fundraises among donors and 
then makes allocations among the various areas of work. The tenants’ work has made a 
significant contribution to ILISHE’s funds by winning the 2002 Body Shop Award for 
Human Rights, which brought US$75,000 to the organisation. It is fair to say that the 
initial determination to build financial self-sufficiency through savings in preparation for 
the eventuality of purchasing the houses has been replaced by a reliance on fundraising 
from donors through ILISHE on a ‘project’ basis. The award served to weaken further the 
previous emphasis on linking grassroots mobilisation with building up savings. On the 
whole, the economic power of the tenants’ associations is very weak, made worse by 
fluctuations in the number of people actively involved in the struggle.  
 
What is the nature of the political system? 
The following features of the political system have had significant implications for the 
tenants’ struggle: political party competition; the relationship between central and local 
government; public institutions’ accountability to Parliament; and the degree of 
protection of citizens’ rights from the excesses of politicians and bureaucrats.  
 
Political party competition 
In an ideal situation, parties compete on the basis of programmes and ideologies, and 
therefore social movements are able to form strategic alliances with any party whose 
agenda is congruent with the movement’s goals so as to advance their struggle. The 
situation in Kenya is far from this ideal. Party politics since independence has lacked 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 This divergence of views emerged at a review meeting held at ILISHE, Mombasa, 14 December 2004. 
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genuine competition among alternative policies. Following ten years of legally imposed 
single-party rule, Kenya has had three multi-party elections: in 1992, 1997 and 2002, the 
last of these unseating KANU (from central government as well as from Mombasa) for 
the first time in 40 years. Even though the major parties publish manifestos, their political 
rallies and public discourse in general is dominated by ethnic posturing rather than by 
issues (Gatabaki-Kamau et al. 2000 :75; Southall and Wood 1996; Mutunga 1999). The 
politics of ethnicity has acquired a peculiar sharpness in Mombasa and in Coast province 
generally since the clashes of the 1997 elections, intended to flush out watu wa bara (up-
country people, people who are not regarded as indigenous to the coastal region).  
 
This context cannot be ignored in analysing citizen engagement with public institutions. 
The areas in which the council estates are located are densely populated and therefore any 
organised group constitutes an attractive vote bank for local politicians and aspirants. The 
tenants’ struggle has not escaped the politics of ethnicity. Among the tenants there are 
suspicions that the reason why the council has paid no attention to the state of the estates 
is because the majority of tenants are watu wa bara – up-country people. 
 
The political climate plays a big role in determining the types of strategies citizens’ 
collective action will adopt. In a party-based political system that is not defined by issues 
and programmes, patronage sets in. There have been moments of setback in mobilisation 
efforts, when the respective tenants’ associations that make up the joint Shelter 
Committee were in disagreement about whether to align their interests (and therefore 
political support) with a particular politician.  
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Relationship between central and local government 
The relationship between central and local government in Kenya has been marked by 
determination by the former to control local affairs. The Local Government Act, which 
defines the functions of local authorities, gives a lot of oversight powers to the Minister 
for Local Government. For instance, local authorities need the Minister’s approval for 
their budgets, employment decisions and the setting of local rates (such as property 
rates), as well as the Attorney-General’s approval for any by-laws enacted. The 1998 
Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) Act requires central government to designate 5 
per cent of income tax revenue to local governments, which is then allocated among the 
various councils on the basis of population and subject to the councils’ submission of a 
detailed budget and service delivery plan (Smoke 2004). This allocation, in addition to 
local rates and licence fees, makes up most of the local councils’ revenue. 
 
With few sources of revenue and an unpredictable flow of central government 
allocations,16 municipal councils are still expected to provide a wide range of services. 
The pressure on local governments to raise revenue locally in meeting their service 
delivery mandate means that Mombasa municipality will be very reluctant to relinquish 
ownership of council estates that bring in a predictable and regular (though meagre) share 
of their revenue. It does not help that the economy of the city as a whole has been in 
decline since 1990 and therefore revenue from business licences and service charges has 
been falling (Gatabaki-Kamau et al. 2000:1). Income from council housing accounts for 
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10 per cent of the council’s revenue.17 The biggest expenditure item is salaries for the 
council’s bloated workforce and the councillors’ generous allowances.18 The irony was 
not lost on the tenants when a newspaper story on a council decision to increase rents by 
30 per cent was published alongside a story on the councillors’ vote to increase their own 
allowances by about 50 per cent.19  
 
The relationship between central and local government is complicated further because the 
local government structure exists side by side with a provincial administration system 
under the Office of the President. This system is governed by a hierarchy that operates in 
a top-down fashion from Provincial Commissioner to District Commissioner, to a 
divisional administration at the sub-district level, then to a chief at the location level, 
assistant chief at the sub-location level and headman at the village level. The lines of 
authority and responsibility are not clearly defined and conflicts between councillors or 
council bureaucrats and district officials have often been bitter.20  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 LATF is expected to make central government remittances more predictable but this is not yet the case. 
Using population as the basis for allocation is rigid and does not respond to changing needs, and is also 
contested (Smoke 2004).  
17 The other revenue sources are: rates (taxes on land) 44 per cent; service charges 19 per cent; market fees 
and commercial rents 10 per cent; business licences 8 per cent; other revenues (from user fees for health 
services, for example, or nursery school fees) 9 per cent (Gatabaki-Kamau et al. 2000).  
18 Salary arrears are a frequent cause of confrontation between the council and its employees. See, for 
example, ‘Council Unable to Pay Arrears’, Daily Nation, 4 January 1995.  
19 See ‘Council Increases Rents’, Sunday Nation, 9 July 2000, p. 4. The same story also exposed 
institutionalised nepotism in employment, whereby each councillor had a quota of employees to bring in, 
and some councillors had exceeded their quota, resulting in overemployment and causing a bitter row at the 
council meeting. 
20 One source of conflict is with respect to a policy that was introduced in 1983, the District Focus for Rural 
Development. Under this policy, a District Development Committee is given the power to approve all 
development projects funded by the central government, even when those projects are proposed by the 
local authority (Government of Kenya 1987; Smoke 2004). The District Development Committee is 
chaired by the District Commissioner and in several cases DCs who did not have good relations with 
elected councillors have frustrated local authority projects. 
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The council tenants encountered this tension in their fight against the grabbing of public 
land. After obtaining the details of ‘grabbed plots’ they tabled these lists before the 
Municipal Physical Planning Liaison Committee, which set up a task force chaired by the 
District Commissioner, comprising the Municipal Engineer, Provincial Commissioner 
and Physical Planning Officer – a mix between council bureaucrats and provincial 
administration officials. The task force confirmed that these plots had indeed been 
irregularly allocated and that the buildings erected on them did not comply with the 
building code, primarily because many of them blocked off access to public amenities. 
The task force recommended revocation of the building approval. This revocation needed 
to be issued by the Town Clerk. The plot owners are wealthy and politically well 
connected, both on the local and national political scene. The Town Clerk was reluctant 
to take any action that the councillors would not approve of. Two months later no action 
had been taken. In April 2001 the tenants’ association in Changamwe estate wrote to the 
committee requesting permission to demolish an illegally erected wall on one of the 
grabbed plots that was blocking a road, seeing as the committee was afraid to take action 
against the grabbers. After a month of waiting in vain for a response from the committee, 
the residents mobilised and demolished the offending wall. In May 2001 the Provincial 
Commission wrote an urgent letter to the Town Clerk directing him not to approve any 
building plans for that plot, or ‘any transaction that would provoke residents’.  
 
In terms of protocol the Provincial Commissioner has no authority to direct the Town 
Clerk. However, the Provincial Commissioner has a mandate to ‘maintain law and order’ 
within his jurisdiction, and the riotous demolition of the wall had turned this into a ‘law 
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and order’ issue. The District Commissioner serving in Mombasa at the time (DC Rotich) 
was particularly responsive to citizens’ complaints about land grabbing, and the tenants 
and other groups took full advantage of this and drew in the provincial administration 
whenever they could.21 It is quite ironic that citizens would turn to the infamous 
provincial administration (reputed to be a top-down authoritarian and unresponsive 
structure) to reign in the excesses of their elected representatives (councillors). This 
should caution against too much faith in representative democracy as a means to secure 
accountability and responsiveness.  
 
Public institutions’ accountability to Parliament 
If political accountability were functioning well, the tenants would be able to get their 
local MP to raise the issue in Parliament through questions to the Ministry of Local 
Government and/or Ministry of Lands and Housing and expect that action would be 
taken, for instance to compel the council to come up with a plan for proper maintenance 
of the estates or a plan for instituting a tenant purchase scheme. The tenants do not 
consider this to be a serious option because local MPs have been implicated in land grabs 
in the previous regime. Tough talk against corruption in the current regime 
notwithstanding, no action has been taken against them. Some MPs previously served as 
councillors and did nothing about poor housing conditions in the estates, and therefore 
the tenants seriously doubt that they can be relied upon to champion their cause in their 
new capacity as MPs. There is also a perception that approaching Parliament in Nairobi is 
a circuitous route, far removed from their reality, and there is no guarantee that the 
Ministry of Local Government will take action, let alone that the council will act on any 
                                                 
21 See ‘Squatters Paid Shs. 2.4m’ Daily Nation, 10 April 2001; ILISHE Trust 2002. 
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directive the Ministry might issue. However, this route is worth a try, if for nothing else 
at least for the sake of building up a record and strengthening the case for more direct 
forms of accountability on the basis that the conventional representation-based system for 
political accountability has failed to serve citizens. The tenants’ own proposal for 
Citizens’ Committees in every ward as a forum for ongoing engagement with MPs and 
councillors expresses a desire for more direct forms of political accountability, but a case 
needs to be built up for them. 
 
Protection of citizens’ rights  
Political power must be configured so as to ensure that the boundaries of the state–citizen 
relationship are observed and that citizens’ rights are protected against the excesses of 
politicians and bureaucrats. In the case of council housing, protection is very weak and 
council tenants are rendered vulnerable. Kenya’s constitution does not provide for a right 
to adequate housing22 or a right to an adequate standard of living. However, these are 
internationally recognised in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, to which Kenya is a signatory.23 A draft constitution produced in March 
2004 after a broadly consultative process of constitutional review does make proposals 
for recognition of a broad range of economic and social rights, including housing, but it is 
                                                 
22 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines ‘adequate housing’ to include 
secure tenure. The other defining features are: availability of services (such as water, heating, lighting, 
refuse disposal), affordability, habitability (protection from damp, cold, heat, rain, structural hazards), 
accessibility (especially to vulnerable groups such as physically disabled, elderly, children), location 
(proximity to employment, schools, health services), and cultural adequacy. See UNCESCR, General 
Comment No.4, Right to Adequate Housing, 1991, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm  
23 Kenya’s constitution recognises a right to private property under Section 75 of the constitution, but this 
has been interpreted narrowly to refer to a right to compensation for compulsory acquisition of property by 
the state. 
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not possible to predict whether or when this new constitution will be enacted.24  
 
There is no statute dealing with housing. The Housing Act (Chapter 117 of the Laws of 
Kenya ) relates narrowly to the activities of the National Housing Corporation. A 
proposal is underway to enact a Housing Act that deals with housing broadly (Draft 
Sessional Paper 2002). Kenya has not had a national housing policy since 1967 
(Sessional Paper No. 5 1966/7). The most recent population and housing census indicates 
an urgent need for such a policy in view of a major housing crisis in urban areas (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 1999). An updated policy is only in the process of being drafted by 
the Department of Housing, and is yet to be presented in Parliament for endorsement 
(Draft Sessional Paper 2002).  
 
The legal and institutional framework governing council tenancy specifically is also 
inadequate. There is no national legislative framework regulating the manner in which 
councils manage housing. This is left to each council’s own by-laws, and many councils 
have not even enacted specific by-laws to deal with housing. Although the Minister for 
Local Government in 1995 issued a legal notice in 1995 stipulating standards of 
habitability for buildings, these relate to new construction and there is no provision for 
their retroactive application to existing housing, nor any clear indication that local 
councils are also bound by the order as owners of buildings, in addition to being the 
enforcers of the order.25  
 
                                                 
24 See http:// www.kenyaconstitution.org.  
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The laws that are intended to regulate landlord–tenant relations are not applicable where 
the government is the landlord. Councils as landlords are exempt from these general laws 
that spell out their obligations to their tenants. In addition, the law makes it less likely 
that council tenants will seek redress to hold councils to account. Government bodies 
(including local authorities) are exempt from the application of the Rent Restriction Act. 
The Rent Restriction Act sets up a Rent Restrictions Tribunal, which offers a cheap 
procedure for resolving disputes in a forum that is easier for low-income tenants to 
access. A low-income tenant is defined as any tenant paying less than Shs. 2,500 a month 
– just under £20. Under this law, a low-income tenant cannot be evicted or have their rent 
increased without an order from the Rent Restrictions Tribunal (Bodewes and Kwinga 
2003: 227). The exemption of government-owned housing from the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal means that low-income tenants of council housing are easier to evict. If they 
wish to challenge their eviction they must pay for the more expensive court process, 
which they are rarely able to do, not only on account of cost, but for fear of reprisals and 
loss of the lease altogether.  
 
The argument for a change in this aspect of law is strengthened in the face of the 
breakdown of accountability mechanisms at the level of council and central government 
responsibility. Council tenants are effectively denied access to justice. In order to protect 
the rights of council tenants as citizens a mechanism for redress is necessary, even if not 
judicial redress. This could take the form of an ombudsperson for public housing, or a 
special dispute resolution tribunal that deals with such disputes involving government 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 44, Legal Notice No. 257, The Local Government (Adoptive By-laws) 
Building (Amendment) Order, 7 July 1995. 
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housing and government land.  
 
In order to play a significant facilitative role in the institutionalisation of gains made by 
struggling groups, rights must be understood and employed as part of a broader strategy 
of political contestation (Hunt 1990: 318, 319). A clear legal framework setting out rights 
and responsibilities in concrete areas goes a long way. However, a struggle that focused 
narrowly on securing legal recognition of a right to adequate housing, for instance, would 
be missing the opportunity for broader political engagement. Such engagement would 
entail articulating a link between inadequate (or lack of) housing and disenfranchisement: 
how it begets other forms of deprivation such as generalised insecurity, inability to access 
quality health and education services, gross under-investment of city government 
revenues in those areas, and citizens’ lack of voice over the way in which the city’s or 
state’s revenue is spent (Appadurai 2001: 28).  
 
What is the nature of the bureaucracy? 
How responsive is the bureaucracy to the citizens who rely on its services? Is the 
bureaucracy professional and relatively autonomous? Does it have systems of fiscal and 
administrative accountability that function reasonably well?  
 
Degree of responsiveness and autonomy 
Conventional understanding expects the relationships of responsiveness and 
accountability to function as follows: bureaucracies involved in service delivery will be 
responsive to citizen needs, and accountable to elected officials (Goetz and Gaventa: 
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2001). This expectation presumes that the bureaucrats have a measure of autonomy and 
that there exists a clear separation of powers between the civil service bureaucracy and 
the system of elected representatives. But bureaucrats in councils do not enjoy autonomy 
from councillors, and the functioning of the bureaucracy that runs council housing 
illustrates this. The council housing docket falls within the Directorate of Housing. But 
proposals by the director have to be endorsed by a resolution passed by the councillors. 
The tenants’ associations learnt the hard way about the effect of the tangled relationship 
between bureaucrats and politicians in the council. One local councillor was very 
supportive of the tenants’ efforts to get the estates converted into Tenant Purchase 
Schemes. The councillor managed to get the director of the housing development 
department on his side, and also cultivated support among a few more councillors. They 
planned to table a draft resolution at a full council meeting. Some tenants who are also 
council employees claim that the reason the proposals were never presented to the 
council is because as soon as the mayor got wind of it he summoned the director of 
housing and told him in no uncertain terms that if he tabled those proposals before the 
council he would be dismissed. Technically the mayor has no power to dismiss the 
director, since the director, like all civil servants, is recruited through the Public Service 
Commission, which is a central government body. He is therefore answerable to the 
Ministry of Local Government and not the council. However, it is not uncommon for 
mayors and councillors to use their influence to get civil servants dismissed or transferred 
to less attractive postings.  
 
In this type of setting bureaucrats cannot afford to be responsive to citizens if to do so 
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jeopardises their careers. Even leaving aside meddling mayors, the set-up gives no 
incentives to council bureaucrats to pay attention to complaints, views or suggestions of 
service users, because their terms of service are not linked to performance. The line of 
accountability only goes upwards to the Ministry, and no reference is made to citizens’ 
assessment. Little wonder, then, that building alliances with bureaucrats has not been a 
feature of the council tenants’ struggle. It would not make strategic sense for a movement 
to invest in cultivating long-term relationships with bureaucrats whose own tenure is so 
precarious.  
 
Fiscal and administrative accountability 
How efficient are the bureaucracy’s systems of fiscal and administrative accountability? 
Fiscal accountability through formal systems of auditing and financial accounting for the 
use of public resources is extremely weak. Ideally, fiscal accountability would mean 
relying first on the council’s own internal auditing procedures to detect abuses, and, 
second, on the general review function performed by the office of the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General, who reports to Parliament on the use of public resources in all 
government agencies, including local authorities. The tenants are able to estimate the 
revenue that the council gets from the rent they pay, but their demands that the council 
make public its expenditure statements have met with no response from the council. This 
information is essential in enabling the tenants to build a case showing that it is possible 
for the council to carry out essential and urgent repairs (to leaking roofs, for example), 
and that tenants’ offers to make labour contributions would make such repairs feasible. 
The tenants’ suspicion is that the council routinely deploys revenue from the rents to pay 
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salaries and has no plan setting aside a portion of the revenue for routine maintenance of 
the estates, a perception that is not helped by frequent worker strikes or strike threats over 
delayed or missed salaries.26 Complete lack of transparency in the management of 
council finances only fuels such suspicions. 
  
There is some hope as awareness spreads about the Local Authority Transfer Fund 
(LATF) and about the requirement that, as a condition of accessing the fund, councils 
develop a Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) in a participatory 
process that involves citizens in identifying priority projects. However, central to 
enabling meaningful direct citizen participation is the ability to access information on 
how the council operates. There is no provision for monitoring of the implementation 
process.  
 
Administrative accountability operates through procedures that require bureaucracies to 
operate within their defined mandate and to report to ministers and legislatures. So in this 
case the directorate of the housing development department would be required to report 
to the Ministry responsible for housing, which would in turn be accountable to the 
relevant parliamentary committee, for instance the Public Investments Committee since 
the estates are public property. No such reporting appears to be required of the 
directorate. As a first step, such a report would provide an inventory of all housing owned 
by the council, which is important in the face of allegations that some have been 
‘privatised’ informally; individual bureaucrats and councillors have sold them off or are 
collecting personal rents from them. That the Ndung’u Commission was unable to get 
                                                 
26 See ‘Council Unable to Pay Arrears’, Daily Nation, 4 January 1995.  
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such an inventory does suggest that councils have something to hide. The Commission 
complains that, of all the public institutions it had to interact with, local authorities were 
the most uncooperative. The Commission requisitioned from each local authority 
comprehensive lists of all public utility lands in its jurisdiction, as well as a list of all 
allocations to individuals and companies. The information supplied was grossly 
inadequate and the Commission concedes that it was unable to establish the full extent of 
land grabbing in areas administered by local authorities (Government of Kenya 2004: 
39). This suggests that serious implementation of a simple reporting requirement has the 
potential to shake up the opaque council bureaucracy and expose irregularities.  
 
The issue of land grabbing exposes administrative accountability failures at higher levels 
implicating the Commissioner of Lands and the Office of the President. As noted in the 
beginning, checks and balances such as the use of an Allocations Committee have been 
dispensed with in favour of unfettered allocation powers personified in the President or 
Commissioner. With respect to public land within townships the Commissioner of Lands 
is authorised to make such land available for sale subject to four conditions.27 The first 
condition – only if such land is not required for public purposes – has evidently been 
breached. In Mombasa’s council estates incidents of sale of functioning marketplaces, 
school playgrounds, road reserves and parking lots attest to this. Second, the 
Commissioner must satisfy himself/herself that the land has been subdivided into plots 
clearly designated as suitable for residential or business purposes. This too has been 
breached: in Tudor, for instance, a commercial building with shops and bars has been 
built right in between residential blocks. Third, any buildings constructed on the plots 
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must conform to specified building conditions. This must be verified by the Town 
Planning Officer and Town Engineer. This has been breached, as evidenced by structures 
on road or railway reserve land and others blocking off access to public amenities. 
Fourth, the land must be sold through an auction, preceded by advertisement and 
balloting ‘unless the President otherwise orders in any particular case’ [source?]. Records 
show that no auction for sale of public land has been held anywhere in the country in the 
last 50 years, and there is no documentation of a presidential order exempting specific 
plots from auction (Government of Kenya 2004: 11). A reasonable interpretation would 
presume that such presidential order must be in writing, even though the statute does not 
say so. It is difficult and futile to distinguish between allocations that had presidential 
exemption (issued verbally) and allocations made by low-level functionaries on the 
pretext of such presidential permission.28  
 
Ultimately, the overall expectation that public land allocations will be in the public 
interest has been gradually eroded as the scrutiny mechanisms have disappeared 
altogether.29 The Ndung’u Commission confirmed and substantiated Kenyans’ suspicions 
that public land allocations were being used to reward political loyalty and to buy votes. 
The Commission found that allocations would intensify in the build-up to a general 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Sections 12–15 of the Government Lands Act, Chapter 280 of the Laws of Kenya (revised edition 1984). 
28 In the absence of transparent processes, fraud has characterised the public land allocation system. 
Examples include: direct allocations by the Commissioner of Lands without presidential delegation of 
powers; allocation of government land that was already alienated for other purposes; multiple allocations of 
the same piece of land; forged letters of allocation bearing the President’s name (which the Commissioner 
of Lands then acts upon to confer title); and even fake documents of title (Government of Kenya 2004: 75). 
29 Similar breaches of procedure became the norm in dealing with ‘special lands’ – lands protected by law 
on account of their ecological integrity, cultural significance and strategic importance such as forests, 
wetlands, historical sites and lands set aside for research and scientific installations (Government of Kenya 
2004: 15). Breaches also plagued settlement lands purchased by the government for purposes of settling 
landless people. 
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election (Government of Kenya 2004). 
 
The tenants’ fight against land grabbing draws attention to issues of scale in struggles for 
accountability: weak groups organising at the local level will focus on local 
manifestations of a problem, their immediate experience of deprivation of rights, but the 
accountability failures are on a nation-wide scale. The local-level organising may at best 
change the behaviour of local powerful individuals or officials, but without changes in 
the policy environment that makes corrupt behaviour possible, even such slight gains at 
the local level become difficult to sustain.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of accountability and responsiveness in citizens’ engagement with public 
service delivery institutions in the case of the Mombasa council tenants’ struggle, through 
the lens of the framework proposed by Goetz and Gaventa, shows a gap between ideals 
and context-specific realities. It becomes clear why, after ten years of struggle, the only 
victories that the tenants can point to have been about staving off the worst harms. These 
are not small achievements by any measure: keeping well-connected business interests at 
bay is remarkable. However, their efforts have not imprinted a legacy on the public 
institutions they have engaged with – in the form of a positive change in policy at local or 
national government level, for instance, or institutionalised changes in the specific 
practices and procedures of the Housing Development Department or municipal council. 
This absence of a lasting legacy is explained by a combination of the factors explored 
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above, namely: the group’s fluctuating social and cultural power and narrow economic 
base; inability to sufficiently distance the group from a politics of patronage and ethnicity 
and cultivate a new way of engaging; and a bureaucracy in which accountability systems 
have broken down and public officials have no incentive to be responsive to service 
users. With respect to the problem of land grabbing, issues of scale make it difficult for 
the tenants’ localised actions to have impact on accountability failures on a national scale. 
 
Inevitably, the tenants’ ongoing struggle will continue to face one key dilemma: they 
need sustained action for long-term institutionalisation of accountability mechanisms in 
the larger political context and in the relevant bureaucracies that play a major role in 
shaping the struggle. Yet struggles for basic rights often have a sense of urgency about 
improvement in one’s condition, and therefore in order for people to join and stay 
committed there must be some indication that this will materialise sooner rather than 
later. This is not easy to resolve, but it seems there is no shortcut to gradually building a 
genuine movement: the shift from protest to proactive action is imperative.  
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